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Unreason, Love,
and Un-Becoming
Queer
renée c. hoogland
Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the
Foundations of Queer Theory by
Lynne Huffer. Gender and Culture
series. New York City: Columbia
University Press, 2009. Pp. 376, 10
illustrations. $84.50 cloth, $27.50
paper.

Mad for Foucault, Lynne Huffer’s
recent attempt at “rethinking the
foundations of queer theory”—as
the book’s subtitle runs—is, in a
way, a rather maddening read.
Whether this is because Huffer is,
by her own admission, madly in
love with (her) “Foucault,” or because her main subject is Foucault’s
first major work, The History of
Madness, published in French in
1961, but only fully translated into
English and published by Routledge in 2006, I am not so sure.
Madness, as Foucault’s famous argument suggests, cannot speak itself; the madman is relegated to
silence or to the outside of civilization, and his (non)existence can
only be spoken by the voice of
morality, reason, and/or (medical)
science. Any discourse about madness, however humble or selfeffacing, thus cannot but ultimately
repeat some of the gestures of precisely the positivist production of
the negativity of madness that it is
Foucault’s, and in his wake,
Huffer’s project to lay bare, and
subvert. Hence, I find myself dancing around discursive impossibilities, if not aporias, that inhere in
Foucault’s original Madness, as
much as in the “ironic terms” of
Huffer’s productive encounter
with this book as “object-event”
(x), a happening, or “coup de foudre” (10), which, while starting off
with Foucault’s question “why
[have] we made sexuality into a
moral experience?” (xv), gradually
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becomes “[her] own story of love”
(16).
As a story of love, Huffer’s book
is as much a loving embrace of a
newly discovered, or, better, a discursively recovered, “Foucault,” as
it is an embrace of the archive, a
succumbing to the “archive fever”
that she had never experienced before she spent a month in the Foucault archives in Normandy in
2006, shortly after the “translationevent,” the appearance in English
of The History of Madness (here
after, Madness). The (to an Englishspeaking audience) more familiar
title Madness and Civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965) is a translation of the
truncated French version, an inexpensive paperback edition of 230
pages (about one-third the length
of the original), which came out
soon after the original, and which,
to Foucault’s apparent chagrin, became the standard edition of the
book. To complicate this erratic
publishing history even further: a
revised edition of the 1961 original
appeared in French 1972, with a
new preface by Foucault—a “marvelous, self-ironizing” one, in
Huffer’s words, that stands in stark
contrast to, and thus forms a “distorting mirror” to the “overly poetic, ‘lyrical’ voice of the young
Foucault” (x) that speaks the (subsequently suppressed) 1961 preface. Huffer foregrounds the
“distorting mirror” of the Foucauldian archive, its doublevoicedness—Foucault, as Deleuze

reminds us, “is haunted by the
double and its essential otherness”
(xii)—to build on the rupturing
event of Madness, and embraces its
disruptive publication history to
testify to its “importance for our
present post-queer age” (x). Reading Madness retrospectively, which,
in the context of queer theory, and
its almost exclusive focus on Foucault’s History of Sexuality One, is
also to read it prospectively, her
aim is, appropriately, dual: on the
one hand, she wants to stipulate
the material presence of the archive, in casu, to mark the traces or
ghosts of the historically variably
defined “madmen”—including, but
not restricted to, the figures of sexual unreason, or queers—and, on
the other, to “unravel some of the
blind spots” (xi) of queer theory
and offer a reading of Madness that
will allow for a “political ethos of
eros” as a practice of self-transformation as a “possibility of alteration in our historical present” (261).
Huffer goes about her ambitious undertaking in five, relatively
long chapters, preceded by—perversely—a preface, as well as an
introduction, interspersed with
four “interludes,” and concluding
with a “postlude.” Each of the
chapters takes on the larger challenge of relaunching a radical form
of queer theory in this, our “present post-queer age,” by a thorough
exploration of one or more aspects
of Madness, Foucault’s monumental, and arguably founding, narrative on sexuality and ethics, the
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urtext, so to speak, that puts both
Sexuality One (1978) and the last
two volumes of The History of Sexuality—The Use of Pleasure (1984)
and The Care of the Self (1984)—
into a significantly different light.
The interludes serve to offer us insight into the personal and pro
fessional contexts that render/ed
Huffer’s passionate encounter with
“Foucault” such a deeply unsettling, yet enabling one; to clarify
her urge to dislodge traditional
thinking about one of the principal
figures in sexuality studies, by, inter
alia, un-coupling the “FreudoFoucauldian foundations” (164) of
queer theory; and to undo the
“performative logic” of (some of)
its most prominent practitioners.
Huffer’s need, in the introduction, to give an “account of herself”—to obliquely recall the title
of a book by one of her main critical targets, Judith Butler—and to
explain her desire to engage with
Foucault as a queer feminist, and as
professor and chair of Women’s
Studies at Emory University at
that, is not altogether surprising in
view of Foucault’s track record as a
gender-blind thinker. Her feminist “defense” nonetheless struck
me as somewhat laborious, and, in
its exhaustiveness, unnecessary.
Her thorough critique of philosophical dismissals of Madness
(most famously, by Jacques Derrida), in contrast—a thoroughness
that is sustained throughout the
subsequent chapters—almost immediately persuaded me of the va-

lidity of Huffer’s chosen task (i.e.,
to “re-queer Foucault”), as well as
of the political significance of her
overall philosophical argument.
Huffer (re)reads Foucault’s genealogy of the “structure of the experience of madness,” which he
himself admits is a “doubly impossible task” (28) (since madness cannot be captured nor can its truth be
spoken), through the lens provided
by Gilles Deleuze in Foucault
(1986), published two years after
Foucault’s death. While Foucault
himself insisted on his role as a
nonhistorian and a nonphilosopher, Deleuze foregrounds the
complex relation between these
two fields in Foucault’s concept of
subjectivity as subjectivation, a
conception Huffer, in her turn,
calls “coextensive” (29). Drawing
on the Deleuzian concept of the
fold, she elaborates a notion of coextension that at once covers the
“cartography that encompasses the
complex relations among social,
historical, political, linguistic, and
conceptual fields,” and that renders the subject “coterminous, contingent, or contiguous with an
outside that is in a continual process of transformation and expansion” (31). It is this idea of
subjectivation as an ongoing process of becoming (other), as coterminous rather than produced—or
constructed—in interaction with
its “constitutive outside” that will
lead Huffer through Madness, and
that ultimately opens the way to
the proposed “political ethic of
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eros.” Before she, and thus we, her
(and Foucault’s) readers, reach this
point, however, a moment of opening up to a future, she/we have a
long and occasionally tortuous way
to go through what at moments
feels like a labyrinthine trek
through a both unfolding and enfolding discursive archive.
The historical journey of the
subject truly begins with the production of madness (and, importantly, of nonnormative sexualities)
at the “moment of division between reason and its others” (40),
the “Cartesian coup of the cogito”
(74) that produced subjectivity
through “structures of moral exclusion” (40). The next stage takes
us, under Huffer’s erudite guidance, through Nietzsche’s critique
of morality, and especially his
“evocation of Dionysian intoxication and nonrationality as a creative force” (87)—so palpably
present in Foucault’s thought—
but also to the image of Nietzsche’s
undoing, his fall into madness,
which, rather than a romantic celebration of transgressive insanity,
as some of Foucault’s critics would
have it, serves to expose the “price
exacted by rationalist moralism
from those who resist its despotic
order” (88). Huffer’s engagement
with Nietzsche’s “moral subject,”
with the production of “bad conscience” through the “unfolding of
the interiority of a seemingly selfcontained subject with an ‘inside,’
a ‘psyche,’ or a ‘soul’” (91), allows
her both to connect the production

of sexuality as an “inner” essence to
the structures of rational morality
of the classical age and further to
evolve her critique of the FreudoFoucauldian link in queer theory
and, therewith, of the model of
sexuality in terms of performativity.
As earlier suggested, Judith
Butler is singled out as the primary
target of Huffer’s postqueer critique, being the “most famous, indeed founding example of [queer
theory’s] performative logic” (113).
Elsewhere, she more approvingly
refers to Eve Sedgwick (praised for
asking “paradigmatically” Foucauldian questions [92]), while she
altogether dismisses, on both political and theoretical grounds, Leo
Bersani’s and Lee Edelman’s
“psyche-driven ‘anti-social’ thesis”
for continuing to “assume the existence of a psyche as a container of
the subject’s death” (115). Her critique of Butler’s performative
model is, in my view, both sound
and convincing, and constitutes
one of the (many) enabling moments for my own thinking about
being/becoming, and not only in
terms of gender/sexuality.
Huffer readily admits that Butler’s reversal of the sex/gender distinction, so that the primacy of sex
(nature) over gender (culture) is
dismantled, is “no small feat” (113).
She goes on to point out, however,
that performativity’s dialectical
logic not only reinforces the binary
opposition between acts and identities most queer readers of Fou-

	ON Huffer’s Mad for fOucault	 313
cault have wrongly considered to
form the center of his argument in
Sexuality One, but also “deploys an
apparatus of cause-effect reversal
and sublation” (113) that differs
from Foucault’s much more radical attempt to “do away with the
subject altogether.” The subversive
or parodic “resignification” of normative gender/sexual identities
leaves the lethal power of Cartesian rationalism, bourgeois moralism, and Freudian psychoanalysis
intact, in that it does nothing to
undo the production of interiority,
the internalization of morality (or,
alternatively, of pathology) that
condemns the (post)Enlightenment subject to its “caged freedom”; in other words, by failing to
address the “historical problem of
the normative internalization of
violence” (116), queer performativity leaves intact that which
Nietzsche, and Foucault with him,
considered the “‘serious illness’
that is the psyche or the soul” (114).
Foucauldian “desubjectivation,” in
contrast, takes Nietzsche’s critique
of moral interiority ultimately to a
renegotiation of subjectivity itself,
promising, in Huffer’s terms,
“forms of self-transformation we
might imagine not as expansions of
the self but as self-unravelings.”
To be sure, Huffer is fully aware
that “desubjectivation as becoming-other” means losing oneself
completely or, indeed, to “be stark
raving mad” (123). But despite the
fact that this is a “horrifying proposition” (123), especially to those of

us who have witnessed or experienced such madness up close, and
that it is, in fact, impossible to really know what “desubjectivation
as becoming-other” means, she
wants to maintain the possibility of
at least trying to think, or dream,
the self otherwise; that is, beyond
the constituting violence of the
cogito and the equally violent
“Freudian coup that establishes
paternal authority within the sovereign structure of the Oedipus
complex” (153). To this end, she
extensively explores the function
of Denis Diderot’s Rameau’s
Nephew, first published in 1805 in
German translation by Goethe, as,
Huffer submits, a central text for a
nineteenth-century Hegel and the
French Hegelians of the twentieth
century. Presented as a threshold
figure of modernity, Rameau’s
nephew, “Diderot’s split subject,”
is as required a character for Foucault as he is for Huffer, in that he
embodies a limit experience, a figure whose “aporetic irony” undermines the “epistemological, ethical,
and aesthetic rationalizations of
the enlightened subject” (200). As a
figure of modern madness, the
self-mocking nephew inhabits a
heterotopian space at the heart of
Foucault’s Madness (nine pages
smack in the middle of the book,
apparently, center on this “queer
nephew”) and opens up, in Huffer’s
project, the “possibility of . . .
queering reason’s heteronormative
filiations.” And this is, as suggested
before, the core of Huffer’s attempt
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at rereading Foucault as an ethical
project, that is, to think (or dream)
ethics as a question of subjectivity,
which, it will be clear, entails, as
much as it requires, the undoing of
the moral subject of reason per se.
Ironically, when Huffer finally
fully unfolds her model of a “political ethic of eros,” she moves
away from the discourse of Madness and retroactively reads its narrative of desubjectivation as a
prelude to Foucault’s (controversial) later writings on ethics in the
ancient world, his defense of the
care of the self, of an ethics of eros
as a transformative rethinking of
life. Foucault’s arts of existence,
she maintains, should be viewed as
a “practice of philosophy and history [that] insists on the importance of the other” (275), as
explicitly concerned with alterity,
an often-overlooked aspect of his
lifelong work, which nonetheless
prominently emerges from his
careful attention to the traces of
those discarded lives, the ghosts of
history illuminated in/by his archival work. Antiromantic and antiirrational, Foucault’s ethics of eros
is thus offered as the “intense
thinking-feeling—an erotic curiosity as care—toward the wounded
vulnerability of the beloved other”
(277–78).
Attractive, compelling, and, indeed, indisputably much more enriching and enabling than either
anti-utopian queer discourses à la
Bersani and Edelman, or David
Halperin’s reduction of a transfor-

mative practical ethics to queer
sexual practices such as gay fisting,
or, indeed, the parodic resignification of normative gender and sexual identities through performative
subversion, I, paradoxically, find
myself somewhat disappointed
with this tender ending of Huffer’s
passionate, occasionally dazzling
love story. This is, I guess, the operation of what Linda Hutcheon
calls “irony’s edge”—approvingly
cited by Huffer in her chapter on
Diderot’s Nephew. For when I described my reading experience of
this book, in my opening paragraph, as “maddening,” I was not
quite aware yet of either the implications of or the reasons for this
readerly effect. Having retraversed
Huffer’s argument in the process
of writing this review, however, I
think my sense of un-ease springs
from the affective dissonance generated by the “unsettling duplicity”
of a discourse that effectively invites us to partake in an unraveling
of all our ideas about ourselves,
about sexuality, about subjectivity,
about subjectivation as such. I am
infinitely more attracted by the
centrifugal force of madness as desubjectivation, as un-becoming,
however “horrifying” a proposition it may be, because of the space
it opens up to think-feel beyond
the “caged freedom” of subjective
being, than by the centripetal force
of an “erotic curiosity of care.”
What does this say about me? I’ll
have to think about that a little
more. What it says about Huffer’s
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book-event seems to be clear: her
intense embrace of Madness offers a
profoundly engaging and unsettling roller-coaster ride through
the founding discourses of not only
queer theory, but of subjectivity itself. One does not have to love
Foucault to find this exciting—or,
indeed, deliciously unbecoming.
renée c. hoogland teaches modern literature,
cultural studies, critical theory, and gender &
sexuality studies in the English Department at
Wayne State University. She is currently
working on a book entitled “A Violent
Embrace: Art and Aesthetics Post-Representation.”

